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     ABSTRACT 
 
 
       
This paper will consider whether the scope of financial regulation should be extended and if so, ways 
in which this could occur. In order to carry out these tasks, it will not only address problems identified 
from the recent crises and Basel 2, gaps which exist in some of the responses to these issues, but will 
also consider what roles other parties such as central banks and external auditors can play in 
achieving financial objectives. To a certain extent, it will address these issues by making references to 
proposals which have been put forward from different sources. It will introduce the points of 
discussion through an overview of global developments which have necessitated the need for a review 
of financial regulation and through a review of the present regulatory objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewing regulatory objectives: Should the scope of financial regulation be extended? 
 
 
Global developments which have prompted a review of financial regulation 
 
Factors such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the derivatives markets, which have been 
facilitated by the impact of information technology and increased competition within the financial 
services industry, have a instigated a change in the way financial regulation is carried out around the 
world. A realisation by countries and their financial institutions that they were at a competitive 
disadvantage as globalisation gained momentum, lead to ultimate liberalisation in these countries.1 
Asymmetric distribution of information between the industry being regulated and the primary 
regulators, notably in North America, the UK and Japan, was partly responsible for the inability of 
regulators to challenge anti competitive behaviour of the financial services industry hence impeding 
their maximisation potential to regulate during the advent of globalisation.2 In Germany and France 
where the financial sector was dominated by state ownership, the issue of asymmetry was not as 
important since banks were the dominant institutions in these countries – owing to their universal bank 
structure.3 
 
As a result of the above mentioned global changes and developments, the benefits of financial 
regulation have not been realised to full potential since financial regulation also needs to evolve with 
changes such as the growth of financial conglomerates, social and economic changes. This has 
resulted in some arguments that regulation could also be detrimental.4 The reasons for differences in 
opinions between those who are in favour of regulation and supervision in finance and those who are 
against, focus around four key issues, namely:5 i) How financial institutions and markets work and 
operate in practice: This would require consideration of the domestic and global financial 
environment, ii) The incentive structures faced by financial firms iii) The extent of market 
imperfections and failures in the financial system and the power of regulation and supervision to 
address these , iv) the extent to which financial products and contracts are substantially different from 
goods and services which are not regulated to the same degree as financial institutions. 
 
 
The rationale for financial regulation is an embodiment of two issues namely:6  
 
The problem of systemic risk7: There being compelling evidence that a stable financial system 
provides conducive environment for efficient allocation of resources which in turn encourages 
                                                 
1  See OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 1997 Volume 1: Sectoral Studies at page 73 -74 
2  ibid at page 74 
3  ibid 
4  D Llewellyn ‘The Economic Rationale For Financial Regulation’ (1999) Financial Services Authority 
London Occasional Paper 1 April 1999 at page 7 
5  ibid at page 5 
6 Speech by Howard Davies, former chairman , Financial Services Authority 'Building the FSA – Progress to 
Date and Priorities Ahead' Wednesday 30 September 1998 <http:// www.fsa.gov.uk> ( last visited 10 June 
2008 ) 
7 Regulation for systemic reasons is required when the social costs of the failure of financial institutions 
(particularly banks) exceed private costs and such potential social costs are not provided for in the decision 
making of the firm. Social costs could arise from systemic situations triggered by a bank run (withdrawal of 
deposits by depositors) which may have contagious effects on other banks.  D Llewellyn 'The Economic 
Rationale For Financial Regulation'  (Financial Services Authority London Occasional Paper 1 April 1999 p 
13  Failure of an insolvent bank could therefore cause other bank depositors to withdraw deposits – thereby 
leading to social costs which the banks (of those other depositors) didn’t anticipate or provide for. Private 
costs would be foreseeable costs of running a bank – costs attributable from a particular bank’s activities and 
its own personal and private affairs. Way in which FSA could try to reduce externalities is by effective 
regulation and supervision as systemic crisis can arise from failure of just one bank. The arrangement 
(whereby  the  FSA seeks to achieve the objective of maintaining confidence in the financial system and the 
Bank of England has continued  responsibility for overall  stability of  the financial system) between the  FSA 
and the Bank of England in dealing with systemic risks was finally tested in the summer of 2007 following 
economic growth8. Systemic risk is referred to as the risk that the failure of one firm may affect others, 
resulting in the collapse of the financial system.9  
 
 
The problem of asymmetric information whereby certain information is known to some people but 
not to others10.  
 
Systemic risk 
According to Schwarcz, institutional systemic risk and market systemic risk should be considered 
individually since both can involve markets and institutions.11 A distinction is also made between 
“institutions which are “individually systemic”, “systemic as part of a herd” (for instance, highly 
levered hedge funds), non systemic large and not highly levered, and unlevered institutions12. Further, 
the design of rules such that banks have no incentive to move assets into off-balance sheet vehicles is 
considered desirable with regards to “individually systemic” institutions.13 Hedge funds are considered 
by some to be instruments which do not present significant threats. Schwarcz argues that as 
disintermediation increases, systemic risk should be considered according to its impact on markets and 
not institutions.14 In his opinion and from the perspective of systemic risk, “the business or legal 
characterization of any given institution” should be far less important than whether such an institution 
was a critical financial intermediary.15 Accordingly, he goes on to say that hedge funds are not critical 
financial intermediaries since they do not particularly play a key role in the funding of companies 
when viewed from the perspective of systemic risks.16 However, he adds that hedge funds may 
present a greater threat of risk than other types of business organisations when poor management 
controls operate within the companies, and particularly, when operated in today’s financial 
environment.17 
 
The interconnectedness between modern financial institutions and market participants, along with the 
complexity of such institutions, contribute to failures which result in systemic risk.18 The role played 
by bank depositors’ perceptions in triggering bank runs is illustrated by Kaufman.19 If bank depositors 
                                                                                                                                                        
the collapse of Northern Rock.  
8 Speech by Howard Davies, former chairman , Financial Services Authority 'Building the FSA – Progress to 
Date and Priorities Ahead' Wednesday 30 September 1998 <http:// www.fsa.gov.uk> ( 10 June 2006 ) 
9  P Cartwright, Bankers, Consumers and Regulation 2004 Hart Publishing at pg 192; For a consideration of the 
role of law in the prevention of bank failures and for causes of bank failures when they occur, see A 
Campbell and P Cartwright,  Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response 2002 Dartmouth Publishing 
10 Ibid; Market failures include information problems, externalities and conflict of interests. If financial services 
were operated in perfectly competitive markets (there were no information problems, externalities, conflicts 
of interests etc) there would  be  no reason for regulation. Since market imperfections and failures are 
unavoidable, the FSA could help reduce the problem through its objectives of consumer awareness (thereby 
preventing information problems). It could also impose  rules relating to the way in which the regulated firm 
must behave (in order  to avoid conflicts of interest). The establishment of the Financial Services Consumer 
Panel has contributed a lot towards helping to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. 
11  S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ Washington University Law Review, Vol. 87, 
No. 2, 2009-10 at page 202 
12  See M Brunnermeier and others, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 24; A distinction is also drawn between regulation 
which is involved with factors that affect the stability of individual institutions (micro prudential regulation) 
and regulation which involves factors that affect the stability of the financial system as a whole – see ibid at 
page 6 
13  ibid  
14  S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ Washington University Law Review, Vol. 87, 
No. 2, 2009-10 at page 202 
15  ibid 
16 ibid at 203 
17 ibid 
18 S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ at page 30 
19  G Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk and Bank Regulation’ < http://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedhfi/wp-96-
1.html> (last visited 25 May 2009> 
perceive other banks in the system to be solvent and re deposit at those institutions, the aggregate 
effect of such a run will be relatively small. 
 
Information disclosure 
 
Regulation facilitates the enhancement of information disclosure through the management of a 
database of transactions, from which market participants can determine how risks have been 
allocated.20.This reduces the possibilities of risks, such as counter party risks21, from developing. 
 
Evaluating Responses to Global Developments 
 
Problems identified from recent crises: Maturity mismatches 
 
According to Brunnermeier et al22 failures such as Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
were triggered not only by their inability to transfer their liabilities (funding illiquidity), but also their 
inability to sell mortgage products at “non-fire sale-prices” (market illiquidity). The extent to which 
the maturity of funding determines the risk of an asset is an important  lesson from the Crash of 
2007/2008.23 A reason which was attributed to Northern Rock’s vulnerability was its excessive 
reliance on wholesale funds.24 “Wholesale funds are obtained from non financial corporations, money 
market mutual funds, foreign entities and other financial institutions. Typically, the funds are raised on 
a short-term basis through instruments such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper, repurchase 
agreements and federal funds.”25 
 
Consideration of an asset’s market liquidity is considered to be an essential pre requisite for the 
effective maturity of an asset.26 “……if capital is to be risk sensitive, it must be sensitive not just to 
the risk of assets, but to the risk of the combination of the asset and its funding, which includes the 
leverage and maturity mismatch.”27 Four potential sources of protecting the financial system from 
failure of wholesale financial markets, and hence illiquidity, are identified28  and these are: i ) Banks 
and other financial institutions ii) private insurance iii) the central bank iv) public insurance  
 
Basel II 
 
Risk cycles are usually pro-cyclical due to misperception by banks and markets about how risks move 
over the period.29 There has been worry that the new Basel Accord on banks' capital standards could 
worsen this misperception by banks and markets – danger being that from 2006, banks would have to 
adjust their minimum capital requirements over time to align with changes in measured risk.30 As a 
result, banks' internal risk assessment would vary more than it should over the course of the cycle.31  
                                                 
20  For further information on this, see S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ at page 41 
21  Counter party risk is a form of information failure which occurs where there is a lack of transparency 
regarding the financial condition of the counter party. Such information failure is aggravated where no 
contracts exist between private parties. Uncertainty is increased as a result of the inability of market 
participants to gauge the extent of the other participant’s exposure on these contracts; ibid at page 30 
22  See ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11’, 
Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 36 
23  see ibid at viii 
24  S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Chart 3 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html (last visited 25 May 2009) 
25  ibid 
26  See M Brunnermeier and others,‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 42 
27  ibid at 41 
28  ibid at page 7 
29 “Bubble and squeak”  The Economist  Sept 26th 2002 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1336105> 
30 ibid;  
31 ibid 
Pro cyclical problems were revealed following the collapse of Northern Rock where it was highlighted 
that it was complying with Basel capital requirements and had excess capital on the eve of its crash.32 
 
Another problem identified with Northern Rock was that it had high leverage – relying heavily on debt 
to finance its assets.33 
 
 
 
In response to Basel II’s shortcoming and since capital regulation contributes to the degree of 
economic downturns34, a complement of the rules on bank capital with rules on liquidity and leverage 
is proposed by Cociuba as a means of addressing the inadequacy of risk based capital measures in 
promoting the stability of the financial system.35 
 
 
 
 
Source36 
 
 
Furthermore, counter cyclical regulatory mechanisms have been proposed to address pro cyclical 
problems which have not been addressed by Basel II.37 
                                                 
32 see S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Northern Rock had obtained 
approval from the Financial Services Authority to switch to Basel II advanced approach in order to calculate 
risk weights for its assets using the bank’s internal models. In December 2006, its capital ration was 11.6 
under Basel I calculations but this jumped to 17.5 under Basel II. In June 2007, this had risen to 18.2%; for 
further information on this see S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation? 
33  Ibid; Leverage is pro cyclical – being high during booms and low during downturns. Whilst some other 
institutions adjusted their balance sheets by raising new equity or selling assets to repay some debt, Northern 
rock did not reduce its debt; ibid. 
34  Since banks choose to reduce lending when capital is scarce 
35 ibid 
36   Taken from S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Chart 3 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html (last visited 25 May 2009) 
37  See M Brunnermeier and others,‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at pages 29-35 
 
Other criticisms directed towards Basel 2 include supervisory discretion – that this could result to 
regulatory capture, that it is excessively risk sensitive, that its capital formula is too prescriptive and 
complex and that it is not well-suited for 90% of the world's population.38 
Regulatory responses to corporate failures 
 
One of the aims of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, a post Enron consequence, is directed towards restoring 
investor confidence in financial reporting. One of the major problems with Enron was the off balance-
sheet debt which resulted from direct application of rules without the ability to consider the substance 
of the transaction because accounting standards did not permit this. Section IV of the Act39 concerns 
itself with measures aimed at enhancing financial disclosures.40 Corporate collapses, particularly that 
of Enron, raised consideration of the following points: i )The regulation of auditors – Enron 
highlighted the fact that self-regulation and peer review in the US were no longer enough ii) The 
elimination of conflicts of interests in accounting firms; iii) compulsory rotation of auditors – 
highlighted from the fact that Arthur Andersen had audited Enron since its establishment in 1983.41 
The collapse of Enron also led to suggestions that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) , its 
standard setting body (the FASB – the Financial Accounting Standards Board) may have to consider 
embracing international accounting standards.42  
 
European response to corporate scandals has been more confined – relying more on self-regulation, 
corporate governance codes and the “comply or explain” principle.43According to Hopt44, an 
improvement of corporate governance in Europe, in the aftermath of Enron would require the 
involvement of intermediaries such as external auditors. Furthermore, he notes that the control of the 
Board by auditors is not only the “most common”, but also the “most prominent control 
mechanism”.45 The fact that Enron’s board appeared to have been exemplary, by corporate governance 
standards, and yet failed to protect its shareholders46 provides sufficient proof of the need for a reform 
of the Board. 
 
In its preamble, the 2008 Revised Combined Code on Corporate Governance states that good 
corporate governance should not only contribute to better company performance by helping a board 
discharge its duties in the best interests of the shareholders, but should also facilitate efficient, 
effective and entrepreneurial management that can deliver shareholder value over the larger term.47 
Transparency and Disclosure rules are set out under the Listing Rules of Schedule C.48 In countries 
                                                 
38 K Alexander,  'Corporate Governance and Basel II'  (paper presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, Russell Square on the 7th October 2004) 
39 See House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury; Examination of Witnesses: Mr Michael Groom, Mr 
Peter Wyman, Mr David Bishop, Mr Roger Adams, Mr Bruce Epsley and Mr Richard Mallet, Wednesday 10 
April 2002 at page 1 
40  The section deals with disclosures in periodic reports (section 401), enhanced conflict of interest provisions 
(section 402), disclosures of transactions involving management and principal stock holders (section 403), 
and the disclosure of audit committee financial expert (section 407), amongst other provisions.  
41  See ’Enron: The real scandal’ The  Economist Jan 17th  2002 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=940091> 
42  ibid 
43 M Becht,, P Bolton, and A Röell,. ‘Corporate Governance and Control’(2002). ECGI - Finance Working Paper 
No. 02/2002.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.343461  page 72 
44 K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After 
Enron’ CGI Law Working Paper No. 05/2002  at page 476 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=356102> 
45 ibid at page 497 
46  See Corporate Governance and Control Finance Working Paper N°. 02/2002  page 74 
47 See 
<http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined_Code_June_2008/Combined%20Code%20
Web%20Optimized%20June%202008(2).pdf> (last visited 27 May 2009) 
48 In Hopt and Leyers’ opinion, disclosure constitutes an important link between internal controls and the 
supervisory board or, in the one-tier board model, non-executive directors and external controls. Further, a 
strategic finding of the High Level Group of Company Law experts in their report to the European 
such as Germany, Italy and the UK, a special body of rules for listed companies, have arisen from both 
hard and soft law.49 
 
At European level, the challenge presented by corporate reform is considered to extend beyond the 
identification of “the key elements of, and most desirable reforms for corporate governance”.50  
According to Hopt and Leyer, recent developments in Europe have not only indicated a trend towards 
specialised rules for listed companies, but also point to increasing convergence of internal control 
mechanisms – independently from board structures.51  In Germany, the key role assumed by the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) was bolstered by the German Corporate Governance Code of 200252 
whilst the duties of the Italian internal auditing committee (Collegio Sindicale) were extended by the 
Testo Unico of 1998.53 
 
The German Corporate Governance Code of 200854 is aimed not only at making the German 
Corporate Governance system more transparent and comprehensible55, but also to increase confidence 
amongst international and domestic investors, customers, employees and the general public.56  
 
 
Two arguments in favour of mandatory rules for regulatory intervention are as follows:57 The main 
argument consists in the fact that there would be a tendency for the founder of the firm or the 
shareholders to draft inefficient rules even if they were able to design and implement their preferred 
corporate charter. The second argument is that firms may want to break or amend efficient rules later – 
even where the right incentives to design such efficient rules exist initially. Furthermore, it is argued 
that corporate governance should not operate in isolation – and that it requires capital market law.58 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commission at the end of 2002 is that general disclosure rules can facilitate greater integration within the 
internal market. See K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European 
Corporate Governance After Enron’ CGI Law Working Paper No. 05/2002 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=356102> at page 23 
49  See K Hopt and P Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance 
Structures in Germany, the United States, France and Italy ECGI Working Paper No 18/2004 at page 20  
50 K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After 
Enron’ at page 449. Furthermore, in Hopt’s opinion, the fact that a rule may be good or necessary for good 
corporate governance does not necessarily indicate that it is appropriate at European level. 
51  See K Hopt and P Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United States, France and Italy ECGI Working Paper No 18/2004 at 
page 5 of 30 
52  Which has been consolidated by the German Corporate Governance Code of 2008 
53 See K Hopt and P Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance 
Structures in Germany, the United States, France and Italy .The Testo Unico 1998 has been consolidated with 
the coming into force of the Testo Unico 2008 
54  German stock corporations operate according to a dual board system which consists of : 1) The management  
board who is responsible for managing the enterprise whilst the chairman of the management board 
coordinates the work of the management board and 2) The supervisory board who appoints, supervises and 
advises the members of the management board. Furthermore, the supervisory board is also responsible for 
setting up the Audit Committee which deals with matters relating to accounting, risk management and 
compliance, the required independence of the auditor, issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor and the 
stipulation of audit fees. 
55 In making the corporate governance system more comprehensible, the code clarifies the rights of  
shareholders, who provide the company with the required equity capital and who bear the entrepreneurial risk.  
56  See <http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/E_Kodex%202008_final.pdf> (last visited 27 
May 2009) 
57  See D Denis and J McConnell ‘International Corporate Governance’(2003 ). ECGI - Finance Working Paper 
No. 05/2003; and Tuck-JQFA Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues II Conference. < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=320121 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.320121> at pages 10,11 of 122 
58  K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After 
Enron’ CGI Law Working Paper No. 05/2002  at page 23 
 
The extension of roles assumed by parties to the regulation and supervision of the financial 
system 
 
In some countries like the UK, regulatory and supervisory functions have been transferred from the 
central bank to a separate agency – hence resulting in a reduced role for the central bank in 
supervision. This paper is in favour of the central bank playing a greater role in supervision.59 In 
addition to the need for such an increased role, functions assumed by third parties such as the external 
auditor, need to be increased. In supporting an increased role for the central bank, reference will be 
made to the second main issue which embodies the objectives of financial regulation, namely, the 
problem of asymmetric information. In supporting the external auditor’s potential to carry out direct 
supervisory functions (on behalf of the regulator), reference will be made to the issue of systemic risk. 
 
Systemic risk  
In order to overcome the myths surrounding the quantification and control of risks, “risks must be 
made auditable and governable.”60 
 
Since societal risks61 are difficult to quantify, it could be argued that focus should be placed on 
preventing, detecting and rectifying the effects of institutional risks.62 
 
Risk management of institutional risks, even though this generates risks (which are the consequence of 
an omission of other significant risks), can be undertaken using the audit risk model – especially since 
the assessment of risks, based on differences in perceptions63, is so subjective. 
 
 
Limitations of the audit risk model 
 
The audit risk model does not account for certain risks which the auditor is exposed to. Examples of 
such risks include loss or injury to their professional practice from litigation, adverse publicity or other 
events which relate to the audited financial statements.64 Those risks which are not accounted for 
within the audit risk model are generally referred to as “engagement risk”, “client risk” or “client 
continuance (or acceptance) risk”65. 
 
Furthermore, the definition of audit risk does not consider the risk that the auditor may mistakenly 
deduce that financial statements are materially misstated.66 Where such situation arises, the auditor 
simply makes a re consideration or extends audit procedures with requests that specific tasks be 
                                                 
59  However, in jurisdictions like Italy, the central bank’s powers had to be curtailed in order to increase the 
powers of CONSOB – the stock exchange regulator- . This was a way of ensuring that greater accountability 
was fostered between regulatory agencies. 
60  See M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 10; also see U Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 
61  “Traditional and novel” risks, are referred to as “societal risks”. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A 
Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) 
Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92 
62  institutional risks are implied to include risks encountered by institutions which are responsible for managing 
and regulating societal risks and/or legitimacy risks (to their rules and practices) - regardless of whether these 
institutions are state or non state institutions; see H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk 
Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and 
Society (35) 1 at page 92 
63  Attitudes to risk vary with individuals and may be different at different levels of an organization. “Risk 
attitudes or appetites may also vary across different aspects of the same risk, may in reality not correspond to 
any stated appetite and may change with new or better information.” See M Power, The Risk Management of 
Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 19 and 20. Also see B Hutter, Risk 
and Regulation (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
64  See <http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF> page 2 of 20 
65  ‘The Audit risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf > at page 177 
66  See http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF at page 2 of 20 
performed by management to re evaluate the relevance of the financial statements.67 The audit risk 
model’s tendency to ostracize certain user groups from the system to the environments, has been 
highlighted.68 
 
Asymmetric information 
 
In addition to the need for early warning indicators, regulators need to develop close links with the 
market and consumers. Central banks are better equipped with such indicators.69 Illustrating with a 
jurisdiction like the UK where supervisory functions have been transferred from the central bank to a 
separate agency, the Bank of England’s early warning indicators are based on monetary information 
provided by banks and other financial institutions under the Bank of England Act 1998. The external 
auditor could not gain access to such information. Market surveillance at industry level is much wider 
than the relationship which the external auditor has with the firm. For this reason, a close relationship 
between the regulator, central bank, market and consumers, is vital in ensuring that problems 
attributed to asymmetric information are addressed. The external auditor’s involvement would still be 
beneficial. Whilst external auditors cannot provide early warning signals or perform market 
surveillance in the same capacity as central banks or regulators, they have valuable and vital third 
party knowledge of firms – hence could provide vital information as well as performing numerous 
specialised tasks at an individual firm level – if not at an industry level. 
 
The problem of asymmetric information also contributes to the problem of systemic risk. An 
awareness by consumers of deposit protection is vital to preventing a bank run – hence preventing 
systemic risks from occurring. Consumers will be encouraged to leave their deposits at their banks 
where compensation for losses of such deposits exist. However, Cartwright70 notes a lack of awareness 
amongst consumers of such protection. Banks should ensure that their customers are well informed of 
financial products and services.71 
 
Information flow between the external auditor and the consumer is hence illustrated as follows:  
 
External auditor ---Æ regulator---Æ    bank -----Æ consumer 
       <-----                <----                 <----- 
 
(exchange of information is in both directions) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Should the Scope of Regulation be Addressed? 
 
Some lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007/08 indicated flaws in the following areas:72  
: 
• Market discipline : This was ineffective in constraining risk taking outside the banking sector 
• An underestimation of the systemic importance of some non banks institutions 
• That regulators (and supervisors) failed to take adequate account of the systemic risks 
presented by the interaction between regulated and unregulated institutions activities (such as hedge 
funds), and markets.  
 
                                                 
67  ibid 
68  TJ Andersen, ‘Perspectives on Strategic Risk Management’ (2006) Copenhagen Business School Press 
Denmark at pages 96 
69  . External auditors are not equipped to perform market surveillance in the same capacity as central banks or 
regulators. 
70  See P Cartwright, Bankers, Consumers and Regulation 2004 Hart Publishing at page 205 
71  This could be undertaken via mail correspondence or clear advertisement at bank branches 
72 See A Carvajal and others ‘The Perimenter of Financial Regulation’ (2009) SPN/09/07 at page 4 of 17 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf >(last visited 18 May 2009) 
Having considered the lessons from the recent crises, Basel 2, and the continued systemic importance 
of non bank institutions and hedge funds, it is without doubt that the scope of regulation needs to be 
addressed. The importance of roles played by parties such as the external auditor and central banks in 
regulation and supervision has been highlighted. In relation to more difficult areas, such as the 
regulation of hedge funds, steps are being taken to strengthen the regulation of institutions within such 
areas through73 clearer and tougher rules on consolidation which should operate alongside more 
effective supervision of the activities, entities and risks of financial institutions. Furthermore, work is 
being carried out, not only to strengthen the supervision of counter party risk in regulated institutions, 
but also to ensure that an effective framework operates both for solo and consolidated prudential 
supervision of regulated securities and insurance companies.74 The regulatory objectives as they stand 
may appear to accord greater importance to systemic risk. However the potential of asymmetric 
information problems to contribute to problems attributed to systemic risk should also be given 
consideration. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions where the central bank is not involved in 
supervision, 75 clear allocation of responsibilities between the central bank and the agency responsible 
for carrying out supervision and regulation is vital to ensuring the stability of the financial system. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73  See ibid at 4 
74 ibid 
75 In this sense, the degree of involvement of the central bank may also be minimal 
